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Anticipating other organisms’ actions in order to make 
quick decisions, such as whether to approach or flee, is 
crucial to the survival of many species. In humans, how-
ever, the ability to anticipate what other people will do 
next and adjust one’s own response accordingly under-
pins the unique propensity to engage in joint action, 
cooperation, and collaboration (Sebanz & Knoblich, 
2009).
Recent research suggests that the motor system plays 
a functional role in the ability to anticipate other people’s 
actions. For example, adult observers who are engaged 
in a motor task (Cannon & Woodward, 2008) or who 
have their motor abilities artificially restricted (Ambrosini, 
Sinigaglia, & Costantini, 2012) show an impaired ability 
to anticipate other people’s actions. Human infants, who 
are naturally restricted in their motor abilities, also exhibit 
a relationship between motor ability and action anticipa-
tion. Specifically, previous studies have shown that only 
those infants who can competently perform a particular 
action appear able to anticipate that action when it is 
performed by someone else (Cannon & Woodward, 2012; 
Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006; Gredebäck 
& Kochukhova, 2010; Gredebäck, Stasiewicz, Falck-Ytter, 
Rosander, & von Hofsten, 2009; Kanakogi & Itakura, 
2011).
Action anticipation in all of these studies was measured 
by evaluating the observer’s ability to generate anticipa-
tory saccades toward a target ahead of an ongoing action. 
Given that the pattern of predictive saccades during action 
observation closely resembles the pattern seen during 
action execution, it has been hypothesized that these pre-
dictive saccades depend on the observer having recruited 
a motor representation similar to that which he or she 
would have recruited for executing that same action 
(Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Flanagan & Johansson, 2003). 
Thus, the apparent absence of goal-directed action antici-
pation when adults or infants observe actions for which 
they cannot access a corresponding motor representation, 
either because their motor system is otherwise engaged 
or because they have no prior motor experience with that 
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action, is interpreted as evidence for the importance of 
possessing a motor representation with which the observed 
action can be matched and consequently understood 
(Ambrosini, Costantini, & Sinigaglia, 2011; Ambrosini 
et al., 2012; Cannon & Woodward, 2012; Kanakogi & 
Itakura, 2011).
The assumption underlying all of these studies is that 
the involvement of the motor system in the generation of 
anticipatory saccades enables the observer to understand 
and predict the goal of an action via a process of direct 
matching (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). However, 
although it is clear that an observer’s motor system does 
indeed play a role in prediction (Schubotz, 2007), what 
kind of prediction it facilitates is far less clear. Attributing 
a goal permits one to generate a prediction that the goal 
will be attained, but it also enables one to predict how an 
ongoing action will unfold in pursuit of that goal (Csibra 
& Gergely, 2007). An alternative account of the involve-
ment of the motor system in action perception is thus 
that it enables the observer to generate a prediction 
about how an ongoing action will unfold in pursuit of a 
previously attributed goal (Csibra, 2007). Crucially, 
whereas the direct-matching view logically requires the 
observer to possess a motor representation of the 
observed action in order to understand and subsequently 
predict that action’s goal, the alternative hypothesis pro-
poses that because the same goal can often be achieved 
in different ways, an observer may recruit a different 
motor representation of an action with a similar end and 
use this to predict how another action may unfold (Csibra, 
2007).
There are several reasons to question the assumption 
that involvement of the motor system in action anticipa-
tion implies the recruitment of a corresponding motor 
representation. First, although there is a relationship 
between infants’ motor skill and their ability to anticipate 
actions, it is not clear that it is specifically skill with the 
observed action, as opposed to motor maturity more 
generally, that is driving this relationship. Given that cog-
nitive and motor development are likely to be interre-
lated (Diamond, 2000), it may be that infants with superior 
motor skills are just better at predicting actions or events. 
Second, evidence suggests that, in adults, areas of the 
motor system are recruited when the observer is predict-
ing a broad range of actions, irrespective of whether the 
observer could have recruited a corresponding motor 
representation of that action (Cross, Stadler, Parkinson, 
Schütz-Bosbach, & Prinz, 2013). Thus, the involvement of 
the motor system in action anticipation need not imply 
that the underlying mechanism is one that depends on 
motor correspondence.
Finally, the assumption that the relationship between 
motor capability and action anticipation is mediated by 
access to a corresponding motor representation neglects 
consideration of a wealth of evidence suggesting that 
both adults and infants can make sense of numerous 
actions for which they could not possibly possess a cor-
responding motor representation (Biro & Leslie, 2007; 
Csibra, 2008; Heider & Simmel, 1944; Hernik & Southgate, 
2012; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Ramsey & Hamilton, 2010; 
Southgate & Csibra, 2009). Such evidence suggests that 
adults and infants can understand the goals of actions 
irrespective of whether they would have available a cor-
responding motor representation.
In the current study, we challenged the hypothesis 
that the documented relationship between motor capa-
bility and action anticipation in human infants is driven 
by access to a corresponding motor representation. We 
exploited the fact that the motor system is recruited when 
observers are generating action predictions (Kilner, 
Vargas, Duval, Blakemore, & Sirigu, 2004; Southgate, 
Johnson, Karoui, & Csibra, 2010; Southgate, Johnson, 
Osborne, & Csibra, 2009), and we used motor activation 
as a novel measure of action anticipation. Specifically, we 
asked whether 9-month-old infants would recruit their 
motor system when the context suggested an impending 
action, even if that action was one for which they could 
not recruit any corresponding motor representation. If 
the motor system were recruited during the prediction of 
nonexecutable actions, it would indicate not only that 
infants are able to interpret and anticipate actions outside 
of their motor repertoire, but also that motor involvement 
in action observation is unlikely to reflect a process of 
matching observed actions with existing and correspond-
ing motor representations (Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; 
Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011).
Infants were first familiarized with an action repeat-
edly directed toward one object (the target) in the pres-
ence of another object (the distractor). For one group of 
infants, this action was a human hand reaching and 
grasping (hand condition), but for two further groups, 
either the action was a mechanical claw reaching and 
grasping (claw condition) or the target object moved by 
itself (self-propelled condition). Following familiariza-
tion, infants saw trials in which still frames of either the 
target or distractor object were presented in isolation, 
and we asked whether infants would exhibit motor acti-
vation, which would suggest that they were anticipating 
an action, when presented with the target but not when 
presented with the distractor object. We used electroen-
cephalography (EEG) to measure suppression of the sen-
sorimotor alpha rhythm from baseline as our measure of 
motor activation (Marshall, Young, & Meltzoff, 2011; 
Southgate et al., 2010; Southgate et al., 2009). If lacking a 
corresponding motor representation for an observed 
action results in failure to generate action predictions, we 
should see motor activation for target objects only in the 
hand condition. In contrast, if the motor system is broadly 
involved in action prediction irrespective of the motor 
capacities of the observer and motor activation does not 
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reflect a direct matching process (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 
2010), we would expect to see motor activation when 
infants see the target object regardless of the action type.
Method
Participants
The final sample consisted of thirty-three 9-month- 
old infants (18 males, 15 females; mean age = 275 days, 
range = 259–297 days) who were randomly assigned to 
three conditions (hand, claw, or self-propelled). An addi-
tional 32 infants were excluded because they did not pro-
vide enough artifact-free trials for analysis as a result of 
movement, fussiness, or poor-quality EEG signal (n = 30) 
or because they did not provide any usable trials in the 
first half of the experiment (n = 2). This exclusion rate 
is typical of EEG studies with human infants (Marshall 
et al., 2011; Southgate et al., 2010; Southgate et al., 2009). 
All infants were born full term, were healthy, and had 
normal birth weight.
Stimuli and procedure
Stimuli were created using Apple Final Cut Pro and 
presented on a computer screen with MATLAB (The 
MathWorks, Natick, MA) using the Psychophysics Toolbox 
extension (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). We chose two 
novel, featurally distinct but similarly sized objects as 
stimuli (Fig. 1); the objects serving as the target and dis-
tractor were counterbalanced across infants. Infants first 
observed four familiarization events in which the distrac-
tor object remained stationary while a hand (hand condi-
tion) or claw (claw condition) reached for and grasped 
the target object or the target object appeared to move by 
itself (self-propelled condition). In each case, the target 
object moved or was moved from the top right or left of 
the display toward the center of the display. The objects 
switched locations on Familiarization Trials 2 and 3 and 
returned to their original locations on Trial 4.
Each experimental trial was 4,000 ms and comprised a 
baseline period (1,000 ms), a static period (1,500 ms), 
and an outcome period (1,500 ms). In the baseline 
period, a moving screensaver-like image was shown. On 
target trials, the baseline period was followed by a static 
period, in which infants saw a still frame of the target 
object positioned at the top center of the screen, and in 
the hand and claw conditions, the hand or claw posi-
tioned at the bottom of the screen. During the outcome 
period, the target object moved or was moved toward the 





















Baseline Period Static Period Static PeriodOutcome Period Outcome Period
Target Trials Distractor Trials
Fig. 1.  Experimental paradigm. Infants first saw four familiarization trials, in which one of the two presented objects (target) was consistently 
moved toward the center of the screen by a hand or a claw (hand and claw conditions) or moved by itself (self-propelled condition) while the 
other object (distractor) remained stationary. Familiarization was followed by repeated experimental trials, which started with a static image 
of only one of the objects (with a hand, a claw, or by itself, according to the condition) presented for 1,500 ms. After the static period, either 
the object was moved or moved by itself toward the center of the screen (target trials) or the object remained static for the entire length of 
the trial (distractor trials). Each trial was preceded by a 1,000-ms baseline depicting a moving screensaver-like pattern.
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distractor trials, the static period was the same as on tar-
get trials, but the display continued to remain static dur-
ing the outcome period.
Infants who did not complete at least nine target and 
nine distractor trials were excluded from analysis. Infants 
were video-recorded throughout the session, and we 
excluded any trials in which infants made limb move-
ments or were inattentive. Included infants completed a 
mean of 18 target trials and 17 distractor trials. Infants 
were seated in a darkened room on a caregiver’s lap 
roughly 80 cm from a 30 cm × 40 cm monitor. Brief atten-
tion-getting sounds were played at random to maintain 
infants’ attention, and infants watched trials for as long as 
they were willing. As in previous studies (Southgate et 
al., 2010; Southgate et al., 2009), we identified a 3-Hz-wide 
frequency band that best reflected activity of the senso-
rimotor cortex on an individual basis (this band was 
determined based on infants’ own reaches for objects). 
The frequency band that best reflected activation of 
infants’ sensorimotor cortex was then analyzed for a 
decrease from baseline to the anticipatory period. The 
frequency bands analyzed were 6 to 8 Hz (25 infants), 7 
to 9 Hz (7 infants), and 8 to 10 Hz (1 infant).
EEG acquisition
EEG was recorded using a 128-electrode Hydrocel 
Geodesic Sensor Net (EGI, Eugene, OR). EEG was sam-
pled at 500 Hz, recorded with respect to the vertex elec-
trode, and rereferenced to the average reference prior to 
analysis. Following recording, EEG was segmented into 
4,000-ms segments (beginning 1,000 ms before the begin-
ning of the analysis period and ending 3,000 ms after the 
onset of the analysis period). Time-frequency analyses 
were performed on each artifact-free trial using continu-
ous wavelet transform with Morelet wavelets at 1-Hz 
intervals in the range of 5 to 25 Hz.
To eliminate distortion created by the wavelet trans-
form, we removed the first and last 400 ms of each trial 
and chose a 400-ms baseline period beginning 600 ms 
before the onset of the analysis period. Activity was aver-
aged across each infant’s individual 3-Hz-wide frequency 
band, and activity in the 400-ms baseline period was sub-
tracted from activity in the first 500 ms of the analysis 
period. Average wavelet coefficients within infants were 
calculated by taking the mean across trials. As in previous 
studies, we analyzed activity over a cluster of four left-
hemisphere sensorimotor electrodes (30, 36, 37, and 42) 
and four right-hemisphere sensorimotor electrodes (87, 
93, 104, and 105). The approximate 10-10 electrode 
equivalents are C1, C3, CP1, CP3, C2, C4, CP2, and CP4. 
In addition, to be sure that our data specifically reflected 
changes in the sensorimotor alpha rhythm and not the 
more posterior occipital alpha rhythm, we included for 
comparison a cluster of occipital channels (electrodes 70, 
71, 76, and 83, which approximate O1 and O2 in the 
10-10 layout), where previous studies have shown the 
infant visual alpha rhythm to be dominant (Stroganova, 
Orekhova, & Posikera, 1999). Finally, to confirm that any 
effect was specifically a motor effect, we also analyzed 
activity at left and right frontal sites (electrodes 19, 23, 24, 
and 27 on the left and 3, 4, 123, and 124 on the right, 
which approximate F3 and F4, respectively, in the 10-10 
layout). In all reported analyses, amplitudes were aver-
aged over these clusters of channels.
Results
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted with time (400-ms baseline period vs. 500-ms 
analysis period), object (target vs. distractor), and elec-
trode location (left central vs. right central vs. left frontal 
vs. right frontal vs. occipital) as within-subjects factors 
and condition (hand, claw, or self-propelled) as a 
between-subjects factor. Results revealed significant inter-
actions between time and object, F(1, 30) = 5.77, p = .02, 
ηp
2 = .16, and time and electrode location, F(4, 27) = 6.07, 
p = .001, ηp
2 = .47. There were no main effects or interac-
tions involving condition.
Follow-up repeated measures ANOVAs were then con-
ducted separately for each electrode location. These 
revealed a significant interaction between time and 
object, F(1, 30) = 9.40, p = .005, for left-hemisphere chan-
nels. Separate repeated measures ANOVAs on each trial 
type (target vs. distractor) revealed that there was a sig-
nificant decrease in sensorimotor alpha amplitude from 
baseline to the anticipatory period during target trials, 
F(1, 30) = 12.9, p = .001, but there was no such decrease 
during distractor trials (p = .44). Again, these effects were 
not modulated by the kind of action the infant saw, as 
there was no interaction involving condition (p = .95). 
These data demonstrate that infants recruited their senso-
rimotor cortex (as evidenced by a decrease in sensorimo-
tor alpha amplitude from baseline to the anticipatory 
period; see Fig. 2) when the context suggested an 
impending action. There were no significant main effects 
nor interactions for data from right-hemisphere channels, 
which confirmed previous findings that sensorimotor 
alpha suppression during action prediction occurs pre-
dominantly in the left hemisphere in infants (Southgate et 
al., 2010; Southgate et al., 2009).
Finally, there was a main effect of time in the occipital 
cluster, F(1, 30) = 13.25, p = .001, that was not mediated by 
either trial type or condition (ps > .2). A paired-samples t 
test on data collapsed over object and condition showed 
that, for occipital channels, there was a significant increase 
in alpha amplitude from baseline to the anticipatory 
period, t(65) = 4.16, p = .0001. Occipital alpha is known to 
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be modulated by task demands (Herrmann, Senkowski, & 
Röttger, 2004), so one interpretation of this increase is that 
it reflects the need for infants to remember whether the 
object they were seeing was associated with an impending 
action. Whatever the reason for the increase in occipital 
alpha, the absence of alpha suppression at occipital sites 
confirmed that the left-hemisphere sensorimotor alpha 
suppression we observed was a central phenomenon and 
independent of the visual alpha rhythm. There were no 
significant effects of time, object, or condition in either the 
left or right frontal sites. There was an interaction between 
time and object in right frontal channels that approached 
significance, F(1, 30) = 3.19, p = .08. This effect was driven 
by an increase in alpha from baseline during distractor tri-
als, F(1, 30) = 3.70, p = .06.
Discussion
The data we obtained using a novel measure of action 
prediction suggest that human infants can generate action 
predictions regardless of whether they have access to a 
motor representation of that action. That we found motor 
activation during a period when there was no movement 
but the context implied impending action suggests two 
conclusions. First, the previously reported finding that 
motor activation occurs when both adults and infants are 
making action predictions (Kilner et al., 2004; Southgate 
et al., 2010) suggests that infants were generating action 
predictions for actions that they could not have matched 
with actions in their own motor repertoire. Second, 
although the motor system seems to play a role in action 
anticipation, it is not a role that is dependent on the 
observer possessing a corresponding motor representa-
tion. Although it could be argued that a mechanical claw 
is viewed as isomorphic to a human hand and could be 
matched based on similar form and motion, this cannot 
be the case for the object moving alone in the self- 
propelled condition.
To accommodate the fact that observers can provide 
















































Target Trials Distractor Trials
Fig. 2.  Time-frequency plots showing observed changes in sensorimotor alpha amplitude for target and distractor trials in the three condi-
tions. Each plot shows baseline-corrected activity (averaged over the first 400 ms of each segment) averaged over the four left sensorimo-
tor channels and over all infants in each condition. Zero is the onset of the static analysis period. Results reported in the text are based 
on comparison of the 400-ms baseline period with the first 500 ms of the analysis period.
 at Birkbeck Library on June 11, 2014pss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Motor Activation and Prediction in Infants 833
(e.g., Heider & Simmel, 1944), proponents of the direct-
matching view concede that there may be an alternative, 
nonmotor route through which goals can be identified 
and actions understood (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). 
However, our data show that the motor system is recruited 
when infants anticipate nonexecutable actions and thus 
provide little basis for positing two distinct routes for 
action understanding. We found that the motor system 
was recruited regardless of whether the infant could have 
mapped the observed action onto a corresponding motor 
representation, yet the presence of selective motor acti-
vation on target trials nevertheless strongly suggests that 
infants identified a goal and expected an action. 
Considering these findings, our data provide evidence 
against the view that action understanding or prediction 
are achieved through a process of direct matching.
Although predictive paradigms permit both a predic-
tion about what goal will be attained as well as how that 
goal might be attained, previous work has related motor 
skill to the ability to identify the goal of other people’s 
actions (Ambrosini et al., 2012; Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; 
Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011). However, the current data 
demonstrating that infants identified the goal irrespective 
of motor correspondence, together with previous evi-
dence demonstrating that goal understanding is influ-
enced by the presence of abstract cues (Biro & Leslie, 
2007; Hernik & Southgate, 2012), suggests that it is more 
likely that the role of the motor system in action observa-
tion lies in action anticipation (Csibra, 2007; Jacob, 2008). 
Further support for this view can be garnered from stud-
ies showing that goal familiarity is more important than 
action familiarity in eliciting motor involvement (Gazzola, 
Rizzolatti, Wicker, & Keysers, 2007). A mechanism that 
directly matches observed movement with existing motor 
representations in order to generate a goal understanding 
is inconsistent with this finding. However, if the motor 
system were recruited in order to generate a prediction 
concerning how an action will unfold, the ease with 
which the intended goal can be inferred would be 
crucial.
Previous studies have cast doubt on the hypothesis 
that infants require experience performing an action 
in order to understand that action when performed by 
other people (Biro & Leslie, 2007; Csibra, 2008; Luo & 
Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate & Csibra, 2009). However, 
the growing number of eye tracking studies demonstrat-
ing a relationship between motor skill and predictive sac-
cades, particularly in infants, have given renewed support 
to the direct-matching hypothesis and the importance 
of direct matching for action understanding early in 
development. However, the current study suggests 
that infants can identify goals and generate action predic-
tions accordingly without having a motor representation 
of the observed action. A question that remains is how to 
reconcile our findings with studies showing a relationship 
between action experience and anticipatory saccades. It is 
important to note that the specificity of this relationship 
has not been demonstrated. We do not know whether 
experience with a specific action leads to the ability to 
anticipate that action when other people perform it or 
whether motor maturity more generally is related to the 
ability to anticipate actions performed by others. 
Furthermore, a possible problem for paradigms using 
anticipatory looking to assess infant’s ability to predict 
actions that differ in their familiarity is that anticipatory 
looking relies on the infant disengaging from the action. 
Because the actions that are not in the infant’s motor rep-
ertoire (e.g., mechanical claws grasping or balls propel-
ling themselves) are inherently more novel, it may be that 
infants make less anticipatory saccades in these instances 
because they are less likely to disengage as quickly from 
a more novel stimulus. Recent research suggests that the 
ability to disengage from interesting stimuli increases 
across the first year of life (Elsabbagh et al., 2013).
The presence of motor activation during the predic-
tion of nonexecutable actions supports the view that the 
motor system is broadly involved in event prediction 
(Schubotz, 2007). What predicted event motor activation 
reflects likely depends on the timing of the activation 
because for any given action, what should be predicted 
will depend on where the action is in its course. In a 
previous study, we found an absence of motor activation 
just prior to the outcome of an action that had no visible 
goal (Southgate et al., 2010). In the current study, how-
ever, we found motor activation prior to the onset of the 
action of a self-propelled object despite the fact that this 
action also had no visible goal. This difference may 
reflect the fact that the onset of the action in the self-
propelled condition could be predicted without consid-
ering the outcome of the action, whereas in the previous 
study, predicting what would happen next was more 
dependent on consideration of the outcome.
Although it is not clear how the motor system facili-
tates action anticipation, one possibility is that motor acti-
vation reflects the observer’s recruitment of a motor 
program that, although it may differ from the motor pro-
gram recruited by the actor, could nevertheless bring 
about the same effect (Csibra, 2007). As people generally 
attempt to achieve goals in the most efficient way, when 
the observer and the actor share the same motor capabili-
ties, the observer will likely emulate the effect via a motor 
program that corresponds to that which the actor will 
actually use. In contrast, when the observer lacks the 
same motor capability, he or she may use an alternative 
motor program to emulate the same goal. Empirical evi-
dence showing that adults born without hands recruit 
areas involved in foot movements when observing hand 
actions provides some support for this view (Gazzola, 
 at Birkbeck Library on June 11, 2014pss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
834 Southgate, Begus
van der Worp, et al., 2007). However, there will be cases 
in which such an emulative mechanism will fail. In a pre-
vious study, infants who saw an unfamiliar action pro-
gressing toward a hidden outcome did not show motor 
activation (Southgate et al., 2010). In the absence of any 
way to infer the likely outcome, the observer would have 
no basis on which to recruit an alternative motor pro-
gram that could emulate that outcome.
A similar problem arises during the observation of 
intransitive actions, such as dancing. With no knowledge 
of what the outcome of each movement should be, a 
naive observer would have no basis on which to recruit 
an alternative motor program. This may go some way 
toward explaining why reports of experts recruiting their 
motor systems more during the observation of actions 
with which they are expert come primarily from studies 
of intransitive actions (Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, 
Passingham, & Haggard, 2005; Haslinger et al., 2005).
Whatever the role of the motor system in prediction, 
the fact that it appears to facilitate the prediction of a 
broad range of events both within and outside of the 
observer’s own motor skill would provide infants who 
are limited in their motor skills with a means to generate 
predictions about other people’s actions. Because action 
prediction is a crucial component of collaborative activi-
ties, and collaborative activities are an important way in 
which young humans learn the traditions of their cultural 
group (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005), 
an action-anticipation mechanism that is independent of 
motor skill may allow infants to benefit from the actions 
of other individuals at a time when their own action 
capabilities are just developing.
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